In the experimental module of the AHEAD 1995 data, the sample is randomly split into respondents who get an open-ended question on the amount of total family consumptionwith follow-up unfolding brackets (of the form: is consumption $X or more?) for those who answer "don't know" or "refuse" -and respondents who are immediately directed to unfolding brackets. In both cases, the entry point of the unfolding bracket sequence is randomized. These data are used to develop a nonparametric test for whether people make mistakes in answering the first bracket question, allowing for any type of selection into answering the open-ended question or not. Two well-known types of mistakes are considered: anchoring and yea-saying (or acquiescence). While the literature provides ample evidence that the entry point in the first bracket question serves as an anchor for follow-up bracket questions, it is less clear whether the answers to the first bracket question are already affected by anchoring. We reject the joint hypothesis of no anchoring and no yea-saying at the entry point. Once yea-saying is taken into account, there is no evidence of anchoring.
Introduction
Item non-response in survey data is a well-known problem, particularly if questions relate to sensitive information that respondents are not willing to provide or to information that respondents do not know exactly and find hard to estimate. Examples are the amounts invested in saving accounts or the value of assets such as stocks and bonds, or the value of total family income or consumption. Item non-response becomes particularly problematic if the information is not missing at random, i.e., if the probability of not responding correlates with the amount in question conditional on a set of always observed covariates. See, for example, Manski (1989 Manski ( , 1995 and Little and Rubin (2002, Chapter 15).
Follow-up bracketing questions are often used to reduce the loss of information due to item non-response and to extract at least partial information from initial nonrespondents. See, for example, Juster and Smith (1997) . Particularly in telephone interviews where it is difficult to show range cards on which respondents can choose in one step from a larger number of categories, unfolding brackets can be used to collect banded information. For example, a respondent who answers "don't know" or "refuse" to a question on total family consumption in the past month then gets the question "Can you say whether it was $2000 or more?" If the answer is affirmative, the next question is "Was it $5000 or more?" etc.
The majority of initial non-respondents typically appear to be willing to answer one or more unfolding bracket questions, making unfolding brackets a useful tool to collect at least some information from the initial non-respondents (Juster and Smith, 1997) . Several experiments, however, have shown that the distribution of the categorical answers obtained in an unfolding bracket design depends on the order in which the bracket points are presented. For example, if the first question is "Was it $ 2000 or more?" i.e., the entry point is $2000, the distribution gives more weight to the high consumption outcomes than if the entry point were $500. A psychological explanation is that if people are unsure about the exact amount, the entry point will serve as an anchor that provides some information about their own amount. This phenomenon is known as anchoring (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974) .
The literature shows that anchoring exists and becomes more prominent the more uncertain the respondent is about the exact answer (see, for example, Jacowitz and Kahneman, 1995) . In order to use the answers to unfolding bracket questions for meaningful analysis, the possibility of an anchoring bias needs to be taken into account.
Several models for what the answers to bracket questions look like if they suffer from anchoring have been introduced and estimated, using different sources of experimental data with random entry points. Examples are Hurd et al. (1998) , Herriges and Shogren (1996) , and Cameron and Quiggin (1994) . A comparison between competing models for anchoring, however, has not yet been performed.
In this paper, some existing models for anchoring are considered and their implications are analyzed for differences between the true distribution of the variable of interest and the distribution obtained if anchoring according to a given model is present.
Experimental data on household consumption from the AHEAD 1995 survey will then be used to test some of these implications. The specific feature of these experimental data on total family consumption is that the sample is randomly split in respondents that start with an open question -and get follow-up brackets if they do not answer that -and respondents who are immediately directed to the unfolding bracket questions without being asked an open question (see Hurd et al., 1998) . Although in the first sub-sample initial non-response is substantial and respondents to the open-ended question are probably not a random sub-sample, it will be shown that comparing the combined distribution of open responses and bracket responses in the first sub-population with the distribution in the sub-population of immediate bracket responses provides a test for certain types of anchoring.
Another problem that leads to incorrect answers in an unfolding bracket design is acquiescence or "yea-saying" This is the problem that people have a tendency to answer yes rather than no. See Schuman and Presser (1981) or Hurd (1999) . It implies that answers may depend on the wording of the question. For example, the number of "yes" answers to the question "Was it 2000 or more?" will be higher than the number of "no" answers to the question "Was it less than 2000?" The design of the experimental data used here makes the answers vulnerable to yea-saying.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, some existing models for anchoring are reviewed. In Section 3, we describe the experimental data. Section 4 explains how these data can be used to distinguish between anchoring models in a simple, nonparametric framework. This is applied in Section 5. In sections 4 and 5, full non-respondents who provide neither open-ended nor bracket information are discarded. Section 6 takes them into account, using Manski's worst-case bounds (Manski 1989) . Section 7 incorporates a simple way of "fixed probability" anchoring and acquiescence in the model and leads to the conclusion that acquiescence alone can explain the rejections in Section 5. Moreover, it shows that ignoring the acquiescence problem leads to misleading conclusions about selectivity of open-ended answers and the distribution of consumption that we are ultimately interested in. It also looks at estimates of the acquiescence problem for different groups, defined by, for example, education level or memory skills. Section 8 concludes.
Anchoring Models and Acquiescence Bias
An intuitively appealing anchoring model is the fixed-point model used by Herriges and Shogren (1996) , Hurd (1997) , O'Connor et al. (1999) , and Hurd et al. (2001) . In this model, the entry point E in the first bracket question serves as an anchor for follow-up questions. In the second bracket question the respondent does not compare E to the true amount Y, but to the weighted mean Y* = (1-α)Y + αE for some α between 0 and 1. The intuition is that the respondent is uncertain about the true amount. The entry point E is seen as an indication of what Y could be, and the respondent's updated estimate Y* is drawn towards E. Herriges and Shogren (1996) apply their model to data on willingness to pay for water quality improvement and find an estimate for α of 0.36, with standard error 0.14. They also discuss the possibility that α varies with Y and E.
An important feature of the fixed-point model is that answers to the first bracket question are not affected. Although the respondent's estimate of the true amount will be drawn towards the entry point, it will remain on the same side. Thus if anchoring according to the fixed-point model is the only source of incorrect answers, answers to the first bracket question can be taken at face value. The fixed-point model can be interpreted as a Bayesian model, where respondents update their beliefs about an unknown amount if new information (in the form of an entry point or other bracket point) arrives. Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995) and Green et al. (1998) find evidence suggesting that respondents already give biased answers to the first bracket question. For estimates of objective quantities as well as willingness to pay for public goods, they find that, for high entry point values, the proportion of bracket respondents who report that the amount is larger than the entry point value exceeds the fraction of open-ended answers larger than the entry point value. Hurd et al. (1998) specify a parametric model that captures this phenomenon in a symmetric way, biasing probabilities smaller than 0.5 upwards and probabilities larger than 0.5 downward. The idea is that respondents do not compare the true value Y to the entry point E, but instead compare Y to E+ε, where ε is a mean zero error term, assumed to be normal and independent of all other components of the model. Hurd et al. (1998) use the same device also at follow-up bracket questions, with independent errors that can have a different variance. The model is called a gating model, since respondents have to pass a number of gates to reach their final bracket answer.
Somewhat similar, though not yet applied in this context, are the models for binary regression with contaminated data (e.g., Copas, 1988) or misclassification (e.g. Hausman et al., 1998) . Assume that with some fixed "gating" probability P(Gat), people give the wrong answer. It implies P["no"] = P [Y<E] (1-P(Gat)) + P[Y≥E]P(Gat) and P["yes"] = P [Y≥E] (1-P(Gat)) + P[Y<E]P(Gat). If this probability does not depend on the true value and is thus the same whether the true amount is larger or smaller than the entry point, the reported probabilities will be too large if they are larger than 0.5 and too small if they are smaller than 0.5.
A direct test of yea-saying is preformed by Hurd (1999) . He uses experimental data from the 1996 wave of the Health and Retirement Study, a representative sample of the US population aged 54-64 with their spouses. Respondents were asked "About how much could you sell your home for in today's housing market?" They were forced into brackets and were randomly assigned to an entry point (E=$50,000, E=$100,000 or E=$150,000) and to a question format: "Would it be more than E," "Would it be E or more?" or "Would it be less than E or more than E?" He found that the first two (unbalanced) formats led to many more "yes" answers than the third (balanced) format for non-financial respondents, while there was hardly any difference for financial respondents (i.e., the person in the household most knowledgeable in financial matters).
He interpreted this as evidence of acquiescence related to uncertainty. Acquiescence bias is also a well-known problem in the willingness-to-pay (WTP) literature. For example, Boyle et al. (1998) find evidence of yea-saying for bid levels in the upper tail by comparing open-ended answers and bracket answers on the WTP for a moose hunting site. On the other hand, Frykblom and Shogren (2000) used experimental data to compare open-ended and discrete choice answers on students' WTP for a book ("The Environment") and found no differences, leading them to conclude that problems with discrete choice answers can be due to how the survey is framed rather than to the questions themselves.
The AHEAD Wave 2 Consumption Experiment
We use basically the same data as Hurd et al. (1998) , who describe the data in detail. The AHEAD panel (Assets and Health Dynamics Among the Oldest Old) is roughly representative for the US population over 70 and their spouses. The second wave was mainly done by telephone interviews in 1995. At the end of the regular survey, regular AHEAD participants were asked to complete an additional experimental module. About 75% of all respondents were willing to do this. This is the sample used by Hurd et al. (1998) and for this study.
The participants in the experimental module were randomly separated into 7
groups of approximately equal size. All these groups got some questions on household consumption in the last month, but the question format differed across the seven groups.
Three groups (sample I) started with an open question: "How much did your household spend on consumption in the past month?" 2 Those who answered "don't know" or "refuse" then got unfolding bracket questions, with different entry points for the three groups. The first unfolding bracket question was formulated as "Would the amount be $E or more in the past month?" with E=500, E=1000 or E=2000. If a respondent answered "don't know" or "refuse" to a bracket question, the sequence was stopped. The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the distributions for the immediate bracket respondents by entry point. Again, non-random response behavior might in principle
explain why the open-ended answers tend to be small compared to the bracket responses.
A salient feature of the figure is the fact that the distribution shifts with the entry point. In this case the numbers of observations are much larger and most of the differences are significant. The anchoring models discussed in the previous section provide several explanations for these differences.
There seems to be common agreement in the literature that fixed-point anchoring affects the answers to bracket questions from the second bracket question onwards. The entry point in the first bracket question acts as an anchor and the respondent's estimate is pushed towards it. This phenomenon makes intuitive sense and is studied relatively often in the literature and is not the issue of the current paper. Fixed-point anchoring, however, does not affect the answer to the first bracket question. In this paper we focus on errors in answers to the first bracket questions. We do not analyze the answers to the later bracket question, thus avoiding the need to cope with fixed-point anchoring.
Our nonparametric testing strategy is illustrated in Figure 1 , which is largely derived from the numbers in Table 1 based upon this intuition that looks at these differences at several entry points.
Testing the Fixed-Point Model of Anchoring
A major distinction between the models discussed in section 2 is their implication for the first bracket point. The fixed-point model assumes that the entry point acts as an anchor for later bracket questions but does not affect whether the amount is larger or smaller than or equal to the first entry point itself, and therefore does not lead to an incorrect answer to the first bracket question. In other words, the fixed-point model implies that anchoring does not bias the answers to the first bracket question. The same applies to any
Bayesian model: the first entry point leads to an update of prior information, but will not move the mean or any other location measure of the respondent's subjective distribution past the entry point. Thus a Bayesian model will not lead to biased answers to the first bracket question.
The gating model, on the other hand, assumes that errors can be made at every bracket question, including the first one. Explaining the stylized fact that the distribution shifts in the direction of the first entry point even requires that the errors made in the first question are typically larger than those in the later stages of the unfolding bracket design (Hurd et al., 1998 Since all the questions in the experiment are of the form "Is it E or more?" acquiescence bias always goes in one direction: P[Y<E] will be underestimated, P [Y≥E] will be overestimated, no matter whether E is larger or smaller than (or equal to) the median.
If samples of open-ended answers and bracket answers drawn randomly from the same population would be available, the arguments given above would make it possible to test the joint null hypothesis of no acquiescence bias and no anchoring in the first answer neither the open-ended nor the first bracket question in the follow-up unfolding brackets design (i.e., they always answer "don't know" or "refuse"). We will assume that the groups of complete non-respondents are the same in the two sub-samples.
That is, we assume that people who do not answer an initial bracket question would also preceded by an open-ended question. In other words: the population actually analyzed excludes the people who do not reveal any information at all, and we assume that both samples (I and II) are random samples from this population. Appendix A presents detailed information on complete non-response for each group. It suggests that no systematic differences between samples I and II can be detected, backing up the assumption that is made. Moreover, in section 6 we show how the assumption can be relaxed using Manski bounds (Manski 1989 have to be determined numerically. 2000|II] (t-value 3.9) could also be due to acquiescence bias. This finding, however, would also be in line with gating, since it implies a higher probability of an "extreme" outcome (>2000) for bracket answers than for continuous answers.
Results
Qualitatively, one interpretation of these results seems to be a combination of acquiescence bias and gating. As we will show in Section 7, however, this explanation is likely to be incorrect.
The effect of acquiescence will automatically be increasing with the entry point, because only those whose correct answer is "no" can make an acquiescence error. Few respondents have monthly household consumption less than $500 and should answer "no" if the entry point is $500, but many more have consumption level less than $2000 and should answer "no" if the entry point is $2000. If the acquiescence probability is the same for everyone, we can therefore expect more incorrect answers at $2000 than at $500. A potential caveat of our analysis might be the way in which we treat the focal
points in the open-ended answers, particularly since the entry points are also focal points.
In the approach discussed above, we have taken the answers literally and have used a According to Hurd (1999) , acquiescence bias and anchoring become more important if respondents are more uncertain about the actual amounts. Hurd (1999) analyzes experimental data on asset holdings, and finds that the answers of the financial respondent -the person in the household who is more knowledgeable in financial matters and answers most of the financial questions -are hardly subject to acquiescence bias, while for others, acquiescence bias is quite prominent. We can check whether this also applies to consumption by considering financial respondents (almost 75% of the sample) and other respondents separately. The estimates of the unrestricted model and the restricted likelihood for both groups are presented in Table 3 . The underlying distributions are obviously different: all nonfinancial respondents are married and therefore are in high consumption households, on average, whereas some financial respondents are single and therefore more often in low consumption households. The probability of a focal point answer is smaller for financial respondents than for others, already suggesting that financial respondents are less uncertain about their consumption levels than others. However, the null hypothesis of neither gating nor acquiescence bias is rejected for both financial respondents and others.
The deviations between estimates of P[Y< r E|I] and P[Y< r E|II] are similar for the smallest and largest entry points E=$500 and E=$2000. The t-statistics on these differences are 0.1 and 0.8 at E=$500, and 3.3 and 2.0 at E=$2000, for financial respondents and others, respectively. Only for the intermediate entry point E=$1000, it seems that the (acquiescence) bias is smaller for financial respondents than for others.
Here the t-test does not reject equality for financial respondents (t-statistic 1.3), while it does reject equality for others (t-statistic 2.8).
Relaxing the Assumptions about Full Non-response
Until now we have assumed that there is no selective complete non-response, i.e., the respondents in sample I who neither give an open-ended nor a bracket answer have the same consumption distribution as the respondents in sample II who do not give any bracket answers. In this section we will investigate whether the result obtained above could be due to that assumption instead of to acquiescence and/or gating.
There are several types of non-response. First, the experimental module is given to the respondents at the end of the interview, and before it starts, respondents are explicitly asked whether they are willing to cooperate. About 19.2% of all respondents are not willing to cooperate and thus do not answer any of the questions in the experimental module. Since this selection takes place before respondents know which experimental module they are assigned to (and do not know whether they will be in sample I or sample II), it seems quite reasonable that this selection is not systematically different for the two samples. It may mean that both samples are no longer representative of the population we would ultimately be interested in but will not invalidate the test discussed in the previous sections.
Of the remaining respondents, 0.87% stop somewhere during the experimental module, before coming to the consumption questions (0.83% in sample I, 0.94% in sample II). The samples are split into seven sub-samples (three in sample I, four in sample II) that do not get exactly the same questions, but there seems to be no reason for any systematic difference between samples I and II. It thus seems reasonable to treat these non-respondents to the consumption questions in the same way as those who did not want to participate in the modules. Since they stop before they know which consumption questions they will get, we will assume that their consumption distributions are not systematically different for the two samples.
We can therefore condition on not opting out before the consumption questions start and focus on the third type of full non-response. In sample I, 2.37% of all respondents answer "don't know" or "refuse" to the open-ended consumption question and subsequently also answer "don't know" or "refuse" to the first follow-up bracket question. In sample II, 2.74% answer "don't know" or "refuse" to the first bracket question. Since the survey designs are systematically different here -an open-ended question first versus forced brackets -selection into full non-response might be different for the two samples. We will now check whether such differences could explain the test results in the previous section.
Without further assumptions, even under the null hypothesis of correct answers only, the probability P[Y<E] is no longer identified if full non-respondents are included in the population. The reason is that nothing is known about the values of Y for the full non-respondents. We can, however, apply Manski (1989 Manski ( , 1995 to obtain upper and lower bounds for the probabilities. In that way we can, under the null hypothesis, construct intervals for P[Y<E] on the basis of I and II. Under the null hypothesis these intervals should both contain the common value P [Y<E] . To take account of sampling uncertainty, we will construct confidence bands for the lower and upper bounds of the intervals and thus construct intervals that contain the Manski bounds with at least 95% confidence. The test will then be based upon comparing the intervals based upon samples I and II.
To make this more precise some notation needs to be introduced. 
Similarly, the following Manski bounds can be derived for sample II: II is significantly lower than the lower bound for sample I. The standard error on the difference between these two can be derived along the same lines as in the previous section and appears to be about 0.033, giving a t-value of about 1.4. In other words, if we are willing to assume that full non-respondents in the two samples are completely opposite groups (low consumption versus high consumption), and only consider entry point E=$1000, then we cannot reject the null hypothesis that all reports are correct at the 5% (or even 10%) two-sided significance level.
Similarly, considering the entry point E=$2000, the question becomes whether the upper bound for sample II (0.7092) is significantly different from the lower bound for sample I (0.7755). In this case, the standard deviation on the difference is about 0.025 and the t-value on the difference becomes 2.6. That is, the null hypothesis of correct reports only can be rejected at the 5% level, even if we allow for opposite selection into full non-response in samples I and II. Maintaining the assumption that the open-ended answers are correct, this provides evidence of anchoring or acquiescence bias in the bracket answers. The evidence is quite strong in the sense that any type of selection into full non-response is allowed for, even the most extreme -and obviously not very plausible -case that all non-respondents in one group are from low consumption (i.e., lower than $2000 per month) families while all non-respondents in the other group are from high consumption families. Imposing more assumptions on response behavior (such as monotonicity, see Manski 1989) will make the test more powerful and reinforce the result.
We conclude that the non-respondents cannot explain the variation by entry point, and that a role remains for gating and acquiescence bias.
Fixed Probability Gating and Acquiescence
To investigate more formally whether gating or acquiescence bias (or both) can indeed explain why the null hypothesis is rejected, the model can be extended with a simple form of gating and acquiescence bias, using fixed probabilities of acquiescence and gating. We go back to the assumptions in sections 4 and 5 about full non-response and consider the subpopulation of respondents who provide either open-ended or bracket information. First, we assume that there is a fixed fraction of the population that will automatically answer a bracket question with "yes," irrespective of the true amount and the entry point. Second, we assume that in the rest of the population there is a fixed probability P(Gat) that people give the wrong answer ("yes" if Y<E or "no" if Y≥E).
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With these two additions to the nonparametric model, the probability that a random person in the population answers "yes" if the true consumption amount is less than E, is given by P(Acq) + (1-P(Acq))P(Gat) where P(Acq) is the probability the person is the acquiescent type. The probability that someone answers "no" if the true amount is at least E, is given by (1-P(Acq))P(Gat). For the symmetric case with P(Acq)=0, this model is essentially the same as what Copas (1988, p.234) calls "a simple model for resistant fitting." The general case is similar to the misclassification models used by, for example, Ekholm and Palmgren (1982) , Lee and Porter (1984) or Hausman et al. (1998). 6 Adding these features to the unrestricted model gives a model with one parameter less than the unrestricted model, thus imposing one restriction in the general model. This restriction is not rejected by a likelihood ratio test: the log likelihood of the new model is -5456.91, close to the log likelihood of the unrestricted model in Table 2 . The results of 5 With just one observation we cannot distinguish this model of heterogeneity from one in which everyone in the population has a combination of gating and acquiescence errors such that P("yes"|Y<E)>P("no"|Y>E)>0. For convenience of exposition we adopt the heterogeneity model. 6 The current model is less general than the models in the literature in the sense that yea-saying works in only one direction and makes the probability or reporting a "yes" where "no" would be correct larger than the probability of reporting "no" where "yes" would be correct, but this inequality restriction appears not to be binding.
this intermediate model are presented in Table 4 . The estimates of P(Gat) and P (Acq) suggest that the latter is much more important than the former: the estimate of the gating probability is 0.018 with standard error 0.039, while the acquiescence probability is 0.170 with standard error 0.037.
To explain why the fixed acquiescence probability works well in spite of the seemingly different biases at the three entry points (revealed by Table i.e., about 10.0%-points. These differences are so close to the observed differences in the data that the null hypothesis that this simple model is correctly specified cannot be rejected.
The other panels of Table 4 present the models with either fixed probability gating or fixed probability acquiescence. In the model without fixed probability acquiescence, the gating probability is much larger than if acquiescence is also allowed for. This model is misspecified, however. In the model without gating, the acquiescence probability is close to its estimate if gating is also allowed for, as are all the other parameters. All this suggests that acquiescence alone might explain the anomalies in the data. In any case, it can explain the result of the nonparametric tests. Table 4 and the restricted "benchmark" model without gating or acquiescence in the right hand panel of Table 2 . Compared to the benchmark model, the model allowing for gating only implies a smaller dispersion in the distribution of consumption. This is because part of the "extreme" bracket answers ("no" at E=$500;
"yes" at E=$2000) are explained by gating rather than true low or high consumption values. While the benchmark model estimates just reflect the observed data, the gating model recognizes that part of the large dispersion in the observed data is due to gating, and produces a less dispersed picture of the true consumption values. The differences are small, however.
Larger differences arise when acquiescence is allowed for. In this case, allowing for gating in addition makes no difference -the two curves are virtually the same. But both imply lower true values of consumption than the models without acquiescence. The explanation is clear: in the models allowing for yea-saying, some of the "yes" answers to consumption is lower than the entry point level E can be written as:
All the probabilities on the right hand side can be computed directly from the estimates in Table 2 or Table 4 . For the benchmark (restricted) model in Table 2 we get, for example, an estimate of 0.684 for P[O|Y<1000]. This is somewhat higher than the estimate of P [O] which is 0.672. Thus the benchmark model would imply a small (and insignificant) selection effect, which is positive in the sense that the higher consumption values have higher probability of self-selection in the bracket questions.
According to the most general model in Table 4 , however, we get an estimate of 0.638 for P[O|Y<1000], which is much lower than the estimate of 0.675 for P [O] . Thus the model allowing for acquiescence implies negative selection: respondents with low consumption more often become bracket respondents. The many "yes" responses in the (follow-up) bracket answers do not always reflect high consumption but can partly be explained by yea-saying. The distinction between the two explanations is identified because of the group of forced bracket respondents, which is not subject to selection effects. Prior findings in the literature suggest that acquiescence bias should vary with the amount of uncertainty a subject has about the quantities being queried. Table 5 , shows the results of estimating the model of Table 4 but with acquiescence probabilities only. The estimations are over a number of sub-samples. For example, we find an acquiescence probability of 0.147 among financial respondents only. In almost all cases the estimated acquiescence probability is substantial and its 95% confidence interval does not contain the value zero. There is some variation across subgroups, but this variation is not very large and usually insignificant, because of the smaller numbers of observations (and perhaps also the non-parametric nature of the approach). Still, most of the findings are in line with the notion that people who are more uncertain have a larger probability of acquiescence. For example, financial respondents and respondents with high education level are less subject to yea-saying than others. Using either a self-reported indicator or a test-based
indicator of memory quality, we find that people with better memory are less subject to yea-saying. There is hardly any relation between age or gender and the tendency of yeasaying. The income and wealth patterns seem somewhat surprising, with the higher income and higher wealth respondents more subject to yea-saying. As said before, however, significance levels are low. Only the difference between those with low and high self-rated memory skills is close to significant at the conventional two-sided 5% level (t-value 1.91). 7
Conclusions
In this study, we have investigated the importance of gating and acquiescence bias at the entry point of an unfolding bracket design. Experimental data on consumption where respondents are randomly either first given an open-ended question on household consumption or immediately directed to bracket questions were used to test whether these phenomena are present without making any model assumptions. The main finding is that some bias is present even at the entry point. Further analysis -making additional assumptions on the nature of acquiescence and gating -suggests that acquiescence bias is the main problem, while gating is less important. For the consumption question at hand, ignoring acquiescence leads to misleading conclusions on the selective nature of item non-response and on the inference on the distribution of consumption when selective item non-response is taken into account. It would lead to overestimation of consumption levels and underestimation of poverty rates.
Reducing acquiescence bias in data collection is easy: the bracket questions can be formulated in a neutral way, asking people to choose a category rather than answering "yes" or "no". This has already been implemented in the most recent waves of, for example, the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) and AHEAD. The results of this study suggest that, with these improved questions, it seems at least safe to use the first bracket question in an unfolding bracket design at face value. Given the evidence in the literature that anchoring is a problem also in absence of acquiescence bias, this at the same time means that anchoring at follow up bracket questions must be taken seriously. The fixed point model for anchoring -or another model with Bayesian learning -in which answers to the later bracket questions are affected by the entry point may then be a useful tool. gating, no acq. acq., no gating gating and acq.
Models with and without Gating and Acquiescence
Figure 2. Distribution of Consumption According to Models with and without Fixed Probability Gating and Acquiescence
Groups 3,4,5 and 6 immediately go to the bracket questions. Those who do not answer the first bracket question are coded as 98 (DK/RF); no distinction between DK (don't know) and RF (refuse) is made. There are also some people who have not given any answer to the first (or other) bracket questions; their answer to the bracket question is coded as missing, coded as -1 in Table A2 . They dropped out during the module, before coming to the consumption questions.
Groups 1,2 and 7 first get an open-ended question. Those who answer DK and then answer DK/RF at the first bracket question are given misc_b1=8; those who answer RF to the continuous question and then answer DK/RF to the first bracket question get misc_b1=9. Some people have a missing value for this question (as well as the first bracket question); they get misc_b1=-1. (This might apply to people in nursing homes for whom the consumption question is skipped.) All those for whom either continuous or bracket information is available get misc_b1=0.
The results show that complete item non-response varies between 2.8% in group 1 and 3.8% in group 6. The differences between the groups are small, and there seem to be no systematic differences between the continuous groups (1,2,7) and the immediate bracket respondents (3, 4, 5, 6) .
In Tables A3 and A4 , the same thing is done for financial respondents and nonfinancial respondents separately. Complete non-response is somewhat more common for non-financial respondents, but the differences are small. Neither for financial respondents nor for non-financial respondents, it seems possible to detect any systematic pattern or a relation between complete non-response and whether a continuous question is asked first. 
